to persons, and
taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of
this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the
fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect
whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of
both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as
persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor,
not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to
another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained
in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of
another--the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank,
and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal
denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in
his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the
master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for
all violence committed against others--the slave is no less evidently
regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of
the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article
of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed
character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true
character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under
which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper
criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have
transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is
disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that
if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the
negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with
the other inhabitants.

"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all
sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they
are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have
been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from
the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to
be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of
contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, that
the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their
sla