g the constitutional equilibrium of the government. We have
seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement
of the legislative at the expense of the other departments. The appeals
to the people, therefore, would usually be made by the executive and
judiciary departments. But whether made by one side or the other,
would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view
their different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary
departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small
part only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their appointment,
as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are too far removed
from the people to share much in their prepossessions. The former are
generally the objects of jealousy, and their administration is always
liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. The members of the
legislative department, on the other hand, are numerous. They are
distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of
blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion
of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public
trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are
more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties
of the people. With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the
adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.

But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause
most successfully with the people. They would probably be constituted
themselves the judges. The same influence which had gained them an
election into the legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention.
If this should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case
with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom
every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, would be
composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually were, or who expected
to be, members of the department whose conduct was arraigned. They would
consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them.

It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under
circumstances less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments.
The usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden,
as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party among themselves
might take side with the