not
look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which
this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to
the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between
the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can
bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not,
in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within
extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which
may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil
society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found
expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or
monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation
from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our
attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election
of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by
no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of
other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods
are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they
are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial--as is proposed in the
federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the
longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show,
that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater
share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one
or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by
these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one,
and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction
so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the
people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the
government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little
understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme
power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a
full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain,
where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it
is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is tr
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