le agency as possible in the appointment of the members of
the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require
that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative,
and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of
authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever
with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several
departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in
contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional
expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore,
from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the
judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist
rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications
being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be
to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications;
secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are
held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on
the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments
annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the
judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their
independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to
the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the
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