, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments
would not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all
governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of
opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct,
depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same
opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when
left alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the
number with which it is associated. When the examples which fortify
opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS, they are known to have a double
effect. In a nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be
disregarded. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated
by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is
as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for
by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government
will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the
community on its side.
The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too
strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against
a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of
the whole society. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the
revisions of our established forms of government, and which does so much
honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America, it must
be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be
unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect that all the existing
constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed
the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an enthusiastic
confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled
the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions; of a
universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a universal
resentment and indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no
spirit of party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses
to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future
situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not present
any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended.
But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which would
probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of
maintainin
|