ey have accordingly, IN MANY instances, DECIDED RIGHTS
which should have been left to JUDICIARY CONTROVERSY, and THE DIRECTION
OF THE EXECUTIVE, DURING THE WHOLE TIME OF THEIR SESSION, IS BECOMING
HABITUAL AND FAMILIAR."
The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania; and
the other authority, the Council of Censors, which assembled in the
years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body, as marked out
by the constitution, was "to inquire whether the constitution had been
preserved inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and
executive branches of government had performed their duty as guardians
of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater
powers than they are entitled to by the constitution." In the execution
of this trust, the council were necessarily led to a comparison of
both the legislative and executive proceedings, with the constitutional
powers of these departments; and from the facts enumerated, and to the
truth of most of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears
that the constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in
a variety of important instances.
A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent
necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be
previously printed for the consideration of the people; although this
is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the constitution against
improper acts of legislature.
The constitutional trial by jury had been violated, and powers assumed
which had not been delegated by the constitution.
Executive powers had been usurped.
The salaries of the judges, which the constitution expressly requires
to be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases belonging to the
judiciary department frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and
determination.
Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of
these heads, may consult the journals of the council, which are in
print. Some of them, it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar
circumstances connected with the war; but the greater part of them
may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted
government.
It appears, also, that the executive department had not been innocent
of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations,
however, which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion
of the instance
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