greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny
in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which
surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America
with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of
which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects
of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their
oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition
that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making
the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of
insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise
form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which
the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently
dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it
will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to
their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the
confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily
defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they
seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed
to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those
reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary
to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which
have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of
the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be
ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 47
The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of
Power Among Its Different Parts.
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 30, 1788.
MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and
the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the
particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this
mass of power among its constituent parts.
One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the
political maxim, that the legislative, exec
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