l characteristic principles
of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his
meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim
was drawn.
On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that
the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means
totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate
forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the
prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when
made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts.
All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be
removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form,
when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One
branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional
council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole
depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested
with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges,
again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to
attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a
legislative vote.
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be
inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative
and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers," he did not mean that these
departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the
acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more
conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to
no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined
by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed
also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of
justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme
judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not
among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole
executive power resid
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