opensity exemplified.
Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between
the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances
between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that
the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had
no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and
particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the
people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as
many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal government,
whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the
one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each
side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the
predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and
faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts
of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the
operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the
State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected
at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment,
and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate
will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures.
Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the
people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of
men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election
into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the
federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of
the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which
is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too
overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the
State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment
to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at
all, to the local influence of its members.
The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the
United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the
particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence
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