or carrying the general powers into execution, the
task would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to
this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have
been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this
consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions,
and described the residue by the general terms, NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER,
it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the
excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least likely
to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course
select such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the
unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less
forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made.

Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt
that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the
general powers would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable
implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized;
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore,
been pursued by the convention, every objection now urged against their
plan would remain in all its plausibility; and the real inconveniency
would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on
critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the
Union.

If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress
shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers
not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should
misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general
power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to
be violated; the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should
violate the irrespective constitutional authorities. In the first
instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive
and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the
legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from
the people who can, by the election of more faithful representatives,
annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress
may be more confided in ag