rsion of the fundamental principles of all
government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society every
where subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a
monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.

3. "The Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several
State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of
the United States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation to support this Constitution."

It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State
magistracy should be bound to support the federal Constitution, and
unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the
United States, in favor of the State constitutions.

Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself
with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the federal
government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions
into effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the
contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal
Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will depend, in
all cases, on the legislatures of the several States. And the election
of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same
authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be
conducted by the officers, and according to the laws, of the States.

4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might
be added those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments:
but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I
pass them over in this.

We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or
quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part
of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary
objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of
power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question,
whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union
shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall
be preserved.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 45

The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments.

Considered For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 26, 1788