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[Footnote 1: Govardhana's _Nyayabodhini_ on _Tarkasa@mgraha_, pp. 9, 10.]

[Footnote 2: "_Avyabhicarinimasandigdharthopalabdhi@m vidadhati
bodhabodhasvabhava samagri prama@nam._" _Nyayamanjari_, p. 12.
Udyotakara however defined "prama@na" as upalabdhihetu (cause of
knowledge). This view does not go against Jayanta's view which I have
followed, but it emphasizes the side of vyapara or movement of
the senses, etc. by virtue of which the objects come in contact with
them and knowledge is produced. Thus Vacaspati says: "_siddhamindriyadi,
asiddhanca tatsannikar@sadi vyaparayannutpadayan kara@na eva caritartha@h
kar@na@m tvindriyadi tatsannikar@sadi va nanyatra caritarthamiti
sak@sadupalabdhaveva phale vyapriyate._" _Tatparya@tika_, p. 15. Thus it
is the action of the senses as prama@na which is the direct cause of
the production of knowledge, but as this production could not have taken
place without the subject and the object, they also are to be regarded as
causes in some sense. _"Pramat@rprameyayo@h. pramane
caritarthatvamacaritarthatvam pramanasya tasmat tadeva phalahetu@h.
Pramat@rprameye tu phaloddes'ena prav@rtte iti taddhetu kathancit."
Ibid._ p. 16.]

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the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only
their joint collocation that can be said to determine the effect, for
sometimes the absence of a single element composing the causal
collocation is sufficient to stop the production of the effect. Of
course the collocation or combination is not an entity separated
from the collocated or combined things. But in any case it is the
preceding collocations that combine to produce the effect jointly.
These involve not only intellectual elements (e.g. indeterminate
cognition as qualification (vis'e@sa@na) in determinate perceptions,
the knowledge of li@nga in inference, the seeing of similar things in
upamana, the hearing of sound in s'abda) but also the assemblage
of such physical things (e.g. proximity of the object of perception,
capacity of the sense, light, etc.), which are all indispensable for
the origin of knowledge. The cognitive and physical elements
all co-operate in the same plane, combine together and produce
further determinate knowledge. It is this capacity of the collocations
that is called prama@na.

Nyaya argues that in the Sa@mkhya view knowledge originates
by the transcendent influence of puru@sa on a particular
sta