was to be
done." The reply was prompt, Pope was to bring his forces, "as best
he could," under the shelter of the heavy guns.

Whatever might be the truth as regards the troops, there could be no
question but that the general was demoralised; and, preceded by
thousands of stragglers, the army fell back without further delay to
the Potomac. It was not followed except by Stuart. "It was found,"
says Lee, in his official dispatch, "that the enemy had conducted his
retreat so rapidly that the attempt to interfere with him was
abandoned. The proximity of the fortifications around Alexandria and
Washington rendered further pursuit useless."

On the same day General McClellan was entrusted with the defence of
Washington, and Pope, permitted to resign, was soon afterwards
relegated to an obscure command against the Indians of the
North-west. His errors had been flagrant. He can hardly be charged
with want of energy, but his energy was spasmodic; on the field of
battle he was strangely indolent, and yet he distrusted the reports
of others. But more fatal than his neglect of personal reconnaissance
was his power of self-deception. He was absolutely incapable of
putting himself in his enemy's place, and time after time he acted on
the supposition that Lee and Jackson would do exactly what he most
wished them to do. When his supplies were destroyed, he concentrated
at Manassas Junction, convinced that Jackson would remain to be
overwhelmed. When he found Jackson near Sudley Springs, and
Thoroughfare Gap open, he rushed forward to attack him, convinced
that Longstreet could not be up for eight-and-forty hours. When he
sought shelter at Centreville, he told Halleck not to be uneasy,
convinced that Lee would knock his head against his fortified
position. Before the engagement at Chantilly he had made up his mind
to attack the enemy the next morning. A few hours later he reported
that his troops were utterly untrustworthy, although 20,000 of them,
under Franklin and Sumner, had not yet seen the enemy. In other
respects his want of prudence had thwarted his best endeavours. His
cavalry at the beginning of the campaign was effectively employed.
But so extravagant were his demands on the mounted arm, that before
the battle of Manassas half his regiments were dismounted. It is true
that the troopers were still indifferent horsemen and bad
horse-masters, but it was the fault of the commander that the
unfortunate animals had no rest, that