d the miserable support he
received from the English Government that prevented him, until 1813,
from adopting a bolder policy.)

But if they had shown that the best defence lies in a vigorous
offensive, their offensive had not yet been applied at the decisive
point. To make victory complete it is the sounder policy to carry the
war into hostile territory. A nation endures with comparative
equanimity defeat beyond its own borders. Pride and prestige may
suffer, but a high-spirited people will seldom be brought to the
point of making terms unless its army is annihilated in the heart of
its own country, unless the capital is occupied and the hideous
sufferings of war are brought directly home to the mass of the
population. A single victory on Northern soil, within easy reach of
Washington, was far more likely to bring about the independence of
the South than even a succession of victories in Virginia. It was
time, then, for a strategic counterstroke on a larger scale than had
hitherto been attempted. The opportunity was ripe. No great risk
would be incurred by crossing the Potomac. There was no question of
meeting a more powerful enemy. "The Federals, recruited by fresh
levies; would undoubtedly be numerically the stronger; and the
Confederate equipment, despite the large captures of guns and rifles,
was still deficient. But for deficiencies in numbers and in materiel
the higher morale and the more skilful leading would make ample
compensation. It might safely be inferred that the Northern soldiers
would no longer display the cool confidence of Gaines' Mill or even
of Malvern Hill. The places of the brave and seasoned soldiers who
had fallen would be filled by recruits; and generals who had been
out-manoeuvred on so many battle-fields might fairly be expected,
when confronted once more with their dreaded opponents, to commit
even more egregious errors than those into which they had already
fallen.

September 2.

Such were the ideas entertained by Lee and accepted by the President,
and on the morning of September 2, as soon as it was found that the
Federals had sought shelter under the forts of Alexandria, Jackson
was instructed to cross the Potomac, and form the advanced guard of
the army of invasion. It may be imagined with what feelings he issued
his orders for the march on Leesburg, above which lay an easy ford.
For more than twelve months, since the very morrow of Bull Run, he
had persistently advocated an aggress