hout the day. Against this number 8000 Confederates
had held the pass. Cobb, one of McLaws' brigadiers, who commanded the
defence at Crampton's Gap, though driven down the mountain, had
offered a stout resistance to superior forces; and twenty-four hours
had been gained for Jackson. On the other hand, in face of superior
numbers, the position at Turner's Gap had become untenable; and
during the night Hill and Longstreet marched to Sharpsburg.

September 15.

This enforced retreat was not without effect on the morale of either
army. McClellan was as exultant as he was credulous. "I have just
learned," he reported to Halleck at 8 A.M. on the 15th, "from General
Hooker, in advance, that the enemy is making for Shepherdstown in a
perfect panic; and that General Lee last night stated publicly that
he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying forward
to endeavour to press their retreat to the utmost." Then, two hours
later: "Information this moment received completely confirms the rout
and demoralisation of the rebel army. It is stated that Lee gives his
losses as 15,000. We are following as rapidly as the men can move."*
(* O.R. volume 19 pages 294, 295.) Nor can it be doubted that
McClellan's whole army, unaccustomed to see their antagonists give
ground before them, shared the general's mood.* (* "The morale of our
men is now restored." McClellan to Halleck after South Mountain. O.R.
volume 19 part 2 page 294.) Amongst the Confederates, on the other
hand, there was some depression. It could not be disguised that a
portion of the troops had shown symptoms of demoralisation. The
retreat to the Antietam, although effectively screened by Fitzhugh
Lee's brigade of cavalry, was not effected in the best of order. Many
of the regiments had been broken by the hard fighting on the
mountain; men had become lost in the forest, or had sought safety to
the rear; and the number of stragglers was very large. It was not,
then, with its usual confidence that the army moved into position on
the ridge above the Antietam Creek. General Longstreet, indeed, was
of opinion that the army should have recrossed the Potomac at once.
"The moral effect of our move into Maryland had been lost by our
discomfiture at South Mountain, and it was evident we could not hope
to concentrate in time to do more than make a respectable retreat,
whereas by retiring before the battle [of Sharpsburg] we could have
claimed a very successful campaign."