A strong provost guard was established at Winchester for the
purpose of collecting stragglers. Parties of cavalry were sent out to
protect the farms from pillage, and to bring in the marauders as
prisoners. The most stringent regulations were issued as to the
preservation of order on the march, the security of private property,
and the proper performance of their duties by regimental and
commissariat officers. On September 23, General Jones reported from
Winchester that the country was full of stragglers, that be had
already sent back 5000 or 6000, and that the numbers of officers
amongst them was astonishing.* (*3 O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 629.)
The most earnest representations were made to the President,
suggesting trial of the offenders by drumhead court-martial, and
ordinary police duties became the engrossing occupation of every
general officer.
It can hardly be said, then, that the Confederates had drawn much
profit from the invasion of Maryland. The capture of Harper's Ferry
made but small amends for the retreat into Virginia; and the stubborn
endurance of Sharpsburg, however remarkable in the annals of war, had
served no useful purpose beyond crippling for the time being the
Federal army. The battle must be classed with Aspern and Talavera;
Lee's soldiers saved their honour, but no more. The facts were not to
be disguised. The Confederates had missed their mark. Only a few
hundred recruits had been raised in Maryland, and there had been no
popular outbreak against the Union Government. The Union army had
escaped defeat; Lincoln had been able to announce to the Northern
people that Lee's victorious career had at length been checked; and
12,000 veteran soldiers, the flower of the Southern army, had fallen
in battle. Had General Longstreet's advice been taken, and the troops
withdrawn across the Potomac after the fall of Harper's Ferry, this
enormous loss, which the Confederacy could so ill afford, would
certainly have been avoided. Yet Lee was not ill-satisfied with the
results of the campaign, nor did Jackson doubt the wisdom of
accepting battle on the Antietam.
The hazard was great, but the stake was greater. To achieve decisive
success in war some risk must be run. "It is impossible," says
Moltke, "to forecast the result of a pitched battle;" but this is no
reason that pitched battles, if there is a fair prospect of success,
should be shirked. And in the Sharpsburg campaign the Confederates
had undoubtedl
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