an be made, so that the
victors can go along with the retreating forces pell-mell, it is well
enough to do so; but the attack should be immediate. To follow a
success by counter-attack against the enemy in position is
problematical."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 3 pages 82-3.)

Moreover, so large was the battle-field, so limited the view by
reason of the woods, and with such ease had the Federal attacks been
repulsed, that General Lee was unaware of the extent of his success.
Ignorant, too, as he necessarily was, of the mistrust and want of
confidence in its leaders with which the Federal army was infected,
he was far from suspecting what a strong ally he had in the hearts of
his enemies; while, on the other hand, the inaccessible batteries on
the Stafford Heights were an outward and visible token of unabated
strength.

Jackson, however, although the short winter day was already closing
in, considered that the attempt was worth making. About 3 P.M. he had
seen a feeble attack on the Confederate centre repulsed by Hood and
Pender, and about the same time he received information of
Longstreet's success.

Franklin, meanwhile, was reforming his lines behind the high banks of
the Richmond road, and the approach of his reserves, plainly visible
from the Confederate position, seemed to presage a renewed attack. "I
waited some time," says Jackson, "to receive it, but he making no
forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The
artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an
advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so
promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me
to make preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against
disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the
movement postponed until late in the afternoon, so that if compelled
to retire, it would be under cover of the night."* (* Jackson's
Reports, O.R. volume 21 page 634.)

Jackson's decision was not a little influenced by Stuart, or rather
by the reports which Stuart, who had sent out staff officers to keep
the closest watch on the enemy's movements, had been able to furnish
of the demoralised condition of a great part of Franklin's force. The
cavalry general, as soon as he verified the truth of these reports in
person, galloped off to confer with Jackson on Prospect Hill, and a
message was at once sent to Lee, requesting permission for an
advance. A single can