a is
widespread, that patriotism and intelligence are of vastly more
importance than the habit of obedience, and it was certainly a very
general opinion in America before the war. This idea should have been
effectually dissipated, at all events in the North, by the battle of
Bull Run. Nevertheless, throughout the conflict a predilection
existed in favour of what was called the "thinking bayonet;" and the
very term "machine-made soldier," employed by General D.H. Hill,
proves that the strict discipline of regular armies was not held in
high esteem.

It is certainly true that the "thinking bayonet" is by no means to be
decried. A man can no more be a good soldier without intelligence and
aptitude for his profession than he can be a successful poacher or a
skilful jockey. But it is possible, in considering the value of an
armed force, to rate too highly the natural qualities of the
individual in the ranks. In certain circumstances, especially in
irregular warfare, where each man fights for his own hand, they
doubtless play a conspicuous part. A thousand skilled riflemen,
familiar with the "moving accidents by flood and field," even if they
have no regular training and are incapable of precise manoeuvres, may
prove more than a match for the same number of professional soldiers.
But when large numbers are in question, when the concentration of
superior force at a single point, and the close co-operation of the
three arms, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, decide the issue, then
the force that can manoeuvre, that moves like a machine at the
mandate of a single will, has a marked advantage; and the power of
manoeuvring and of combination is conferred by discipline alone. "Two
Mamelukes," said Napoleon, "can defeat three French horsemen, because
they are better armed, better mounted, and more skilful. A hundred
French horse have nothing to fear from a hundred Mamelukes, three
hundred would defeat a similar number, and a thousand French would
defeat fifteen hundred Mamelukes. So great is the influence of
tactics, order, and the power of manoeuvring."

It may be said, moreover, that whatever may have been the case in
past times, the training of the regular soldier to-day neither aims
at producing mere machines nor has it that effect. As much attention
is given to the development of self-reliance in the rank and file as
to making them subordinate. It has long been recognised that there
are many occasions in war when even the pr