g divisions would be with him when Hooker moved. Bitterly
indeed was he to suffer for his selection of a commander for his
detached force. The loss of 3000 men at Suffolk, had the works been
stormed, and Hood and Pickett marched instantly to the Rappahannock,
would have been more than repaid. The addition of 12,000 fine
soldiers, flushed with success, and led by two of the most brilliant
fighting generals in the Confederate armies, would have made the
victory of Chancellorsville a decisive triumph. Better still had
Longstreet adhered to his original orders. But both he and Mr. Seddon
forgot, as Jackson never did, the value of time, and the grand
principle of concentration at the decisive point.

Happily for the South, Hooker, although less flagrantly, was also
oblivious of the first axiom of war. As soon as the weather improved
he determined to move against Richmond. His task, however, was no
simple one. On the opposite bank of the Rappahannock, from Banks'
Ford to Port Royal, a distance of twenty miles, frowned line upon
line of fortifications, protected by abattis, manned by a numerous
artillery, against which it was difficult to find position for the
Federal guns, and occupied by the victors of Fredericksburg. A
frontal attack gave even less promise of success than in Burnside's
disastrous battle. But behind Lee's earthworks were his lines of
supply; the Richmond Railway, running due south, with the road to
Bowling Green alongside; and second, the plank road, which, running
at first due west, led past Chancellorsville, a large brick mansion,
standing in a dense forest, to Orange Court House and the depots on
the Virginia Central Railroad.

At these roads and railways Hooker determined to strike, expecting
that Lee would at once fall back, and give the Army of the Potomac
the opportunity of delivering a heavy blow.* (* Hooker to Lincoln,
April 12, O.R. volume 25 part 2 page 199.) To effect his object he
divided his 130,000 men into three distinct bodies. The cavalry,
which, with the exception of one small brigade, had moved under
General Stoneman to Warrenton Junction, was to march by way of
Rappahannock Station, and either capturing or passing Culpeper and
Gordonsville, to cut the Confederate communications, and should Lee
retreat, to hold him fast.* (* The cavalry was to take supplies for
six days, food and forage, depending on the country and on captures
for any further quantity that might be required.) General S