eral Sedgwick. If the weather were clear, and the telegraph did
not fail, it seemed impossible that either wing of the Federal army
could fail to be fully and instantly informed of the situation of the
other, or that a single Confederate battalion could change position
without both Hooker and Sedgwick being at once advised.

Moreover, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was so certain that Lee
would retreat that his deficiency in cavalry troubled him not at all.
He had determined to carry out his original design.

May 1.

The next morning--May 1--the right wing was to move by the plank road
and uncover Banks' Ford, thus still further shortening the line of
communication between the two wings; and as the chief of the staff
impressed on Sedgwick, it was "expected to be on the heights west of
Fredericksburg at noon or shortly after, or, if opposed strongly, at
night." Sedgwick, meanwhile, was "to observe the enemy's movements
with the utmost vigilance; should he expose a weak point, to attack
him in full force and destroy him; should he show any symptom of
falling back, to pursue him with the utmost vigour."* (* O.R. volume
25 page 306.)

But Hooker was to find that mere mechanical precautions are not an
infallible remedy for a dangerous situation. The Confederates had not
only learned long since the importance of concealment, and the
advantage of night marches, but in the early morning of May 1 the
river mists rendered both balloons and observatories useless. Long
before the sun broke through the fog, both McLaws and Jackson had
joined Anderson at Tabernacle Church, and a strong line of battle had
been established at the junction of the two roads, the pike and the
plank, which led east from Chancellorsville. The position was
favourable, running along a low ridge, partially covered with timber,
and with open fields in front. Beyond those fields, a few hundred
paces distant, rose the outskirts of a great forest, stretching far
away over a gently undulating country. This forest, twenty miles in
length from east to west, and fifteen in breadth from north to south,
has given to the region it covers the name of the Wilderness of
Spotsylvania, and in its midst the Federal army was now involved.
Never was ground more unfavourable for the manoeuvres of a large
army. The timber was unusually dense. The groves of pines were
immersed in a sea of scrub-oak and luxuriant undergrowth. The soil
was poor. Farms were rare, and the few clea