valry was actively engaged between the
Rappahannock and the Rapidan, testing the strength of the enemy's
columns. The country was wooded, the Federals active, and as usual in
war, accurate information was difficult to obtain and more difficult
to communicate. It was not till 6.30 P.M. that Lee received notice
that troops had crossed at Ely's and Germanna Fords at 2 P.M.
Anderson's division was at once dispatched to Chancellorsvile.

April 30.

The next message, which does not appear to have been received until
the morning of the 30th, threw more light on the situation. Stuart
had made prisoners from the Fifth, the Eleventh, and the Twelfth
Corps, and had ascertained that the corps commanders, Meade, Howard,
and Slocum, were present with the troops. Anderson, moreover, who had
been instructed to select and intrench a strong position, was falling
back from Chancellorsville before the enemy's advance, and two things
became clear:--

1. That it was Hooker's intention to turn the Confederate left.

2. That he had divided his forces.

The question now to be decided was which wing should be attacked
first. There was much to be said in favour of crushing Sedgwick. His
numbers were estimated at 35,000 men, and the Confederates had over
60,000. Moreover, time is a most important consideration in the use
of interior lines. The army was already concentrated in front of
Sedgwick, whereas it would require a day's march to seek Hooker in
the forest round Chancellorsville. Sedgwick's, too, was the smaller
of the Federal wings, and his overthrow would certainly ruin Hooker's
combinations. "Jackson at first," said Lee, "preferred to attack
Sedgwick's force in the plain of Fredericksburg, but I told him I
feared it was as impracticable as it was at the first battle of
Fredericksburg. It was hard to get at the enemy, and harder to get
away if we drove him into the river, but if he thought it could be
done, I would give orders for it." Jackson asked to be allowed to
examine the ground, but soon came to the conclusion that the project
was too hazardous and that Lee was right. Orders were then issued for
a concentration against Hooker, 10,000 men, under General Early,
remaining to confront Sedgwick on the heights of Fredericksburg.

We may now turn to the movements of the Federals.

Hooker's right wing had marched at a speed which had been hitherto
unknown in the Army of the Potomac. At nightfall, on April 30, the
three army corps, a