ible. The usual resource of the defender, if his adversary
marches round his flank, is to strike boldly at his communications.
Here, however, Hooker's communications with Aquia Creek were securely
covered by the Rappahannock, and so great was his preponderance of
strength, that he could easily detach a sufficient force to check the
Confederates should they move against them.

Yet now, as on the Antietam, Lee and Jackson declined to take numbers
into consideration. They knew that Hooker was a brave and experienced
soldier, but they had no reason to anticipate that he would handle
his vast masses with more skill than McClellan. That the Northern
soldiers had suffered in morale they were well aware, and while they
divined that the position they themselves had fortified might readily
be made untenable, the fact that such was the case gave them small
concern. They were agreed that the best measures of defence, if an
opening offered, lay in a resolute offensive, and with Hooker in
command it was not likely that the opportunity would be long delayed.

No thought of a strategic retreat, from one position to another, was
entertained. Manoeuvre was to be met by manoeuvre, blow by
counterblow.* (* "The idea of securing the provisions, waggons, guns,
of the enemy is truly tempting, and the idea has haunted me since
December." Lee to Trimble, March 8, 1862. O.R. volume 25 part 2 page
658.) If Hooker had not moved Lee would have forestalled him. On
April 16 he had written to Mr. Davis: "My only anxiety arises from
the condition of our horses, and the scarcity of forage and
provisions. I think it is all important that we should assume the
aggressive by the 1st of May...If we could be placed in a condition
to make a vigorous advance at that time, I think the Valley could be
swept of Milroy (commanding the Federal forces at Winchester), and
the army opposite [Hooker's] be thrown north of the Potomac."* (*
O.R. vol 25 page 725.) Jackson, too, even after Hooker's plan was
developed, indignantly repudiated the suggestion that the forthcoming
campaign must be purely defensive. When some officer on his staff
expressed his fear that the army would be compelled to retreat, he
asked sharply, "Who said that? No, sir, we shall not fall back, we
shall attack them."

At the end of the month, however, Longstreet with his three divisions
was still absent; sufficient supplies for a forward movement had not
yet been accumulated;* (* "From the condit