egic points become the initial objectives, to
be occupied or threatened either by the main body or detached forces.
It is seldom, however, that these initial objectives are readily
discovered; and it is very often the case that even the ultimate
objective may be obscured.

These principles are well illustrated by the operations in the Valley
of Virginia during the month of May and the first fortnight of June,
1862. After the event it is easy to see that Banks' army was
Jackson's proper objective--being the principal force in the
secondary theatre of war. But at the time, before the event, Lee and
Jackson alone realised the importance of overwhelming Banks and thus
threatening Washington. It was not realised by Johnston, a most able
soldier, for the whole of his correspondence goes to show that he
thought a purely defensive attitude the best policy for the Valley
Army. It was not realised by Jackson's subordinates, for it was not
till long after the battle of Winchester that the real purport of the
operations in which they had been engaged began to dawn on them. It
was not realised by Lincoln, by Stanton, or even by McClellan, for to
each of them the sudden attack on Front Royal was as much of a
surprise as to Banks himself; and we may be perfectly confident that
none but a trained strategist, after a prolonged study of the map and
the situation, would realise it now.

It is to be noted, too, that Jackson's initial objectives--the
strategical points in the Valley--were invariably well selected. The
Luray Gap, the single road which gives access across the Massanuttons
from one side of the Valley to the other, was the most important. The
flank position on Elk Run, the occupation of which so suddenly
brought up Banks, prevented him interposing between Jackson and
Edward Johnson, and saved Staunton from capture, was a second; Front
Royal, by seizing which he threatened Banks at Strasburg in flank and
rear, compelling him to a hasty retreat, and bringing him to battle
on ground which he had not prepared, a third; and the position at
Port Republic, controlling the only bridge across the Shenandoah, and
separating Shields from Fremont, a fourth. The bearing of all these
localities was overlooked by the Federals, and throughout the
campaign we cannot fail to notice a great confusion on their part as
regards objectives. They neither recognised what the aim of their
enemy would be, nor at what they should aim themselves. It was