and magazines of Richmond and Atlanta. The railways, then, leading
from Wilmington and Charleston, the ports most accessible to the
blockade-runners, were almost essential to the existence of the
Confederacy. Soon after the battle of Fredericksburg, General D.H.
Hill was placed in command of the forces which protected them, and,
at the beginning of the New Year, Ransom's division* (* 3594 officers
and men. Report of December 1. O.R. volume 21 page 1082.) was drawn
from the Rappahannock to reinforce the local levies. A few weeks
later* (* Middle of February.) General Lee was induced by Mr. Seddon
to send Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and Pickett,* (*
Pickett, 7,165; Hood, 7,956: 15,121 officers and men.) to cover
Richmond, which was menaced both from Fortress Monroe and Suffolk.*
(* Lee thought Pickett was sufficient. O.R. volume 21 page 623.)

The Commander-in-Chief, however, while submitting to this detachment
as a necessary evil, had warned General Longstreet so to dispose his
troops that they could return to the Rappahannock at the first alarm.
"The enemy's position," he wrote, "on the sea-coast had been probably
occupied merely for purposes of defence, it was likely that they were
strongly intrenched, and nothing would be gained by attacking them."

The warning, however, was disregarded; and that Mr. Seddon should
have yielded, in the first instance, to the influence of the
sea-power, exciting apprehensions of sudden attack along the whole
seaboard of the Confederacy, may be forgiven him. Important lines of
communication were certainly exposed. But when, in defiance of Lee's
advice that the divisions should be retained within easy reach of
Fredericksburg, he suggested to Longstreet the feasibility of an
attack on Suffolk, one hundred and twenty miles distant from the
Rappahannock, he committed an unpardonable blunder.

Had Jackson been in Longstreet's place, the Secretary's proposal,
however promising of personal renown, would unquestionably have been
rejected. The leader who had kept the main object so steadfastly in
view throughout the Valley campaign would never have overlooked the
expressed wishes of the Commander-in-Chief. Longstreet, however,
brilliant fighting soldier as he was, appears to have misconceived
the duties of a detached force. He was already prejudiced in favour
of a movement against Suffolk. Before he left for his new command, he
had suggested to Lee that one army corps only should r