piecemeal, like those of the
Confederates at Malvern Hill, and they had been defeated in detail by
the inferior numbers. The Northern soldiers were strangers to those
general and combined attacks, pressed with unyielding resolution,
which had won Winchester, Gaines' Mill, and the Second Manassas, and
which had nearly won Kernstown. The Northern generals invariably kept
large masses in reserve, and these masses were never used. They had
not yet learned, as had Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, that superior
numbers are of no avail unless they are brought into action,
impelling the attack forward by sheer weight, at the decisive point.
In the second place, none of the Federal leaders possessed the entire
confidence either of their generals or their troops. With all its
affection for McClellan, it may strongly be questioned whether his
army gave him credit for dash or resolution. Pope was defeated in his
first action at Cedar Run. Banks at Winchester, Fremont west of
Staunton, had both been out-manoeuvred. Burnside had against him his
feeble conduct at Sharpsburg. Hence the Federal soldiers fought most
of their offensive battles under a terrible disadvantage. They were
led by men who had known defeat, and who owed their defeat, in great
measure, to the same fault--neglect to employ their whole force in
combination. Brave and unyielding as they were, the troops went into
battle mistrustful of their leader's skill, and fearful, from the
very outset, that their efforts would be unsupported; and when men
begin to look over their shoulders for reinforcements, demoralisation
is not far off. It would be untrue to say that a defeated general can
never regain the confidence of his soldiers; but unless he has
previous successes to set off against his failure, to permit him to
retain his position is dangerous in the extreme. Such was the opinion
of Jackson, always solicitous of the morale of his command. "To his
mind nothing ever fully excused failure, and it was rarely that he
gave an officer the opportunity of failing twice. 'The service,' he
said, 'cannot afford to keep a man who does not succeed.' Nor was he
ever restrained from a change by the fear of making matters worse.
His motto was, get rid of the unsuccessful man at once, and trust to
Providence for finding a better."

Nor was the presence of discredited generals the only evil which went
to neutralise the valour of the Federal soldiers. The system of
command was as rotten in