resolve to maintain their ground which is the peculiar attribute of
the Anglo-Saxon. To claim for any one race a pre-eminence of valour
is repugnant alike to good taste and to sound sense. Courage and
endurance are widely distributed over the world's surface, and
political institutions, the national conception of duty, the
efficiency of the corps of officers, and love of country, are the
foundation of vigour and staunchness in the field. Yet it is a fact
which can hardly be ignored, that from Crecy to Inkermann there have
been exceedingly few instances where an English army, large or small,
has been driven from a position. In the great struggle with France,
neither Napoleon nor his marshals, although the armies of every other
European nation had fled before them, could boast of having broken
the English infantry; and no soldiers have ever received a prouder
tribute than the admission of a generous enemy, "They never know when
they are beaten." In America, the characteristics of the parent race
were as prominent in the Civil War as they had been in the
Revolution. In 1861-65, the side that stood on the defensive, unless
hopelessly outnumbered, was almost invariably successful, just as it
had been in 1776-82. "My men," said Jackson, "sometimes fail to drive
the enemy from his position, but to hold one, never!" The Federal
generals might have made the same assertion with almost equal truth.
Porter had indeed been defeated at Gaines' Mill, but he could only
set 35,000 in line against 55,000; Banks had been overwhelmed at
Winchester, but 6,500 men could hardly have hoped to resist more than
twice their strength; and Shields' advanced guard at Port Republic
was much inferior to the force which Jackson brought against it; yet
these were the only offensive victories of the '62 campaign. But if
in defence the armies were well matched, it must be conceded that the
Northern attack was not pressed with the same concentrated vigour as
the Southern. McClellan at Sharpsburg had more than twice as many men
as Lee; Pope, on the first day of the Second Manassas, twice as many
as Jackson; yet on both occasions the smaller force was victorious.
But, in the first place, the Federal tactics in attack were always
feeble. Lincoln, in appointing Hooker to command the Army of the
Potomac, warned him "to put in all his men." His sharp eye had
detected the great fault which had characterised the operations of
his generals. Their assaults had been