y, in
the campaign against Pope, extricated himself from such a situation
by a bold stroke against his enemy's communications; and the natural
fastness of the Valley, amply provided with food and forage, afforded
facilities for such a manoeuvre which had been altogether absent
before the Second Manassas. Nor was he of Mr. Lincoln's opinion, that
if the Army of Northern Virginia cut in between Washington and
McClellan it would be a simple operation for the latter to about face
and attack the Confederates in rear. He knew, and Mr. Lincoln, if he
had studied Pope's campaign, should have known it too, that the
operation of countermarching, if the line of communication has been
cut, is not only apt to produce great confusion and great suffering,
but has the very worst effect on the morale of the troops. But Lee
had that practical experience which Mr. Lincoln lacked, and without
which it is but waste of words to dogmatise on strategy. He was well
aware that a large army is a cumbrous machine, not readily deflected
from the original direction of the line of march;* (* On November 1
the Army of the Potomac (not including the Third Corps) was
accompanied by 4818 waggons and ambulances, 8,500 transport horses,
and 12,000 mules. O.R. volume 19 part 1 pages 97-8. The train of each
army corps and of the cavalry covered eight miles of road, or fifty
miles for the whole.) and, more than all, he had that intimate
acquaintance with the soldier in the ranks, that knowledge of the
human factor, without which no military problem, whether of strategy,
tactics, or organisation, can be satisfactorily solved. McClellan's
task, therefore, so long as he had to depend for his supplies on a
single line of railway, was not quite so simple as Mr. Lincoln
imagined.

Nevertheless, on November 7 Lee decided to unite his army. As soon as
the enemy advanced from Warrenton, Jackson was to ascend the Valley,
and crossing the Blue Ridge at Fisher's Gap, join hands with
Longstreet, who would retire from Madison Court House to the vicinity
of Gordonsville. The Confederates would then be concentrated on
McClellan's right flank should he march on Richmond, ready to take
advantage of any opportunity for attack; or, if attack were
considered too hazardous, to threaten his communications, and compel
him to fall back to the Potomac.

The proposed concentration, however, was not immediately carried out.
In the first place, the Federal advance came to a sudden sta