spositions of a few batteries, a change
so unimportant as to pass unnoticed in the Confederate reports,
should have imposed a delay, when every moment was precious, of many
hours, proves that Lee's and Jackson's estimate of their opponent's
character was absolutely correct. While McClellan was reconnoitring,
and the guns were thundering across the Antietam, Jackson and Walker
crossed the Potomac, and reported to Lee in Sharpsburg.* (* According
to Jackson's staff officers he himself reported shortly after
daylight.) Walker had expected to find the Commander-in-Chief anxious
and careworn. "Anxious no doubt he was; but there was nothing in his
look or manner to indicate it. On the contrary, he was calm,
dignified, and even cheerful. If he had had a well-equipped army of a
hundred thousand veterans at his back, he could not have appeared
more composed and confident. On shaking hands with us, he simply
expressed his satisfaction with the result of our operations at
Harper's Ferry, and with our timely arrival at Sharpsburg; adding
that with our reinforcements he felt confident of being able to hold
his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R.H. Anderson,
McLaws, and A.P. Hill, which were still behind, and which did not
arrive till next day."* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 675.)

Yet the reinforcements which Jackson and Walker had brought up were
no considerable addition to Lee's strength. Jones' division consisted
of no more than 1600 muskets, Lawton's of less than 3500. Including
officers and artillery, therefore, the effectives of these divisions
numbered about 5500. A.P. Hill's division appears to have mustered
5000 officers and men, and we may add 1000 for men sick or on
detached duties. The total should undoubtedly have been larger. After
the battle of Cedar Run, Jackson had 22,450 effectives in his ranks.
His losses in the operations against Pope, and the transfer of
Robertson's cavalry to Stuart, had brought his numbers down by 5787;
but on September 16, including 70 killed or wounded at Harper's
Ferry, they should have been not less than 16,800. In reality they
were only 11,500. We have not far to look for the cause of this
reduction. Many of the men had absented themselves before the army
crossed into Maryland; and if those who remained with the colours had
seen little fighting since Pope's defeat, they had had no reason to
complain of inactivity. The operations which resulted in the capture
of Harper