n; and although at the same hour the
advanced guard of the Federal right wing had gained much ground, it
was not till four in the evening that a general attack was made on
Turner's Gap. By this time Longstreet, after a march of thirteen
miles, had reached the battle-field;* and despite the determination
with which the attack was pressed, Turner's Gap was still held when
darkness fell. (* The order for the march had been given the night
before (The Invasion of Maryland, General Longstreet, Battles and
Leaders volume 2 page 666), and there seems to have been no good
reason, even admitting the heat and dust, that Longstreet's command
should not have joined him at noon. The troops marched "at daylight"
(5 A.M.), and took ten hours to march thirteen miles. As it was, only
four of the brigades took part in the action, and did so, owing to
their late arrival, in very disjointed fashion. Not all the
Confederate generals appear to have possessed the same "driving
power" as Jackson.)

The defence of Crampton's Gap had been less successful. Franklin had
forced the pass before five o'clock, and driving McLaws' three
brigades before him, had firmly established himself astride the
summit. The Confederate losses were larger than those which they had
inflicted. McClellan reports 1791 casualties on the right, Franklin
533 on the left. McLaws' and Munford's loss was over 800, of whom 400
were captured. The number of killed and wounded in Hill's and
Longstreet's commands is unknown; it probably reached a total of
1500, and 1100 of their men were marched to Frederick as prisoners.
Thus the day's fighting had cost the South 3400 men. Moreover,
Longstreet's ammunition column, together with an escort of 600 men,
had been cut up by the cavalry which had escaped from Harper's Ferry,
and which had struck the Hagerstown road as it marched northward into
Pennsylvania. Yet, on the whole, Lee had no reason to be chagrined
with the result of his operations. McClellan had acted with
unexpected vigour. But neither in strategy nor in tactics had he
displayed improvement on his Peninsular methods. He should have
thrown the bulk of his army against Crampton's Gap, thus intervening
between Lee and Jackson; but instead of doing so he had directed
70,000 men against Turner's Gap. Nor had the attack on Hill and
Longstreet been characterised by resolution. The advanced guard was
left unsupported until 2 P.M., and not more than 30,000 men were
employed throug