war, while the Federal leaders were, with few
exceptions, men who never became conspicuous, or became conspicuous
only through failure."* (* The Antietam and Fredericksburg. General
Palfrey page 53.) And the difference in military capacity extended to
the rank and file. When the two armies met on the Antietam, events
had been such as to confer a marked superiority on the Southerners.
They were the children of victory, and every man in the army had
participated in the successes of Lee and Jackson. They had much
experience of battle. They were supremely confident in their own
prowess, for the fall of Harper's Ferry had made more than amends for
the retreat from South Mountain, and they were supremely confident in
their leaders. No new regiments weakened the stability of their
array. Every brigade and every regiment could be depended on. The
artillery, which had been but lately reorganised in battalions, had,
under the fostering care of General Pendleton, become peculiarly
efficient, although the materiel was still indifferent; and against
Stuart's horsemen the Federal cavalry was practically useless.

In every military attribute, then, the Army of Northern Virginia was
so superior to the Army of the Potomac that Lee and Jackson believed
that they might fight a defensive battle, outnumbered as they were,
with the hope of annihilating their enemy. They were not especially
favoured by the ground, and time and means for intrenching were both
wanting; but they were assured that not only were their veterans
capable of holding the position, but, if favoured by fortune, of
delivering a counterstroke which should shiver the Army of the
Potomac into a thousand fragments.

2. By retreating across the Potomac, in accordance with General
Longstreet's suggestion, Lee would certainly have avoided all chances
of disaster. But, at the same time, he would have abandoned a good
hope of ending the war. The enemy would have been fully justified in
assuming that the retrograde movement had been made under the
compulsion of his advance, and the balance of morale have been
sensibly affected in favour of the Federals. If the Potomac had once
been placed between the opposing forces, McClellan would have had it
in his power to postpone an encounter until his army was strongly
reinforced, his raw regiments trained, and his troops rested. The
passage of the river, it is true, had been successfully forced by the
Confederates on September 5. But it