's invasion of
the Northern States, and when that was accomplished, to push with the
utmost rapidity the work of reorganisation and supply, so that a new
campaign might be promptly inaugurated with the army in condition to
prosecute it to a successful termination without intermission."* (*
Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 554.)
And in his official report, showing what the result of a Confederate
success might well have been, he says: "One battle lost and almost
all would have been lost. Lee's army might have marched as it pleased
on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have
levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country, extorted
tribute from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the
Alleghanies was there another organised force to avert its march."*
(* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 65.)
3. The situation in the West was such that even a victory in Maryland
was exceedingly desirable. Confederate movements in Tennessee and
Kentucky had won a measure of success which bade fair to open up a
brilliant opportunity. Should the Federals be defeated in both the
theatres of war, the blow would be felt throughout the length and
breadth of the Northern States; and, in any case, it was of the
utmost importance that all McClellan's troops should be retained in
the East.
So, when the tidings came of Jackson's victory at Harper's Ferry,
both armies braced themselves for the coming battle, the Confederates
in the hope that it would be decisive of the war, the Federals that
it would save the capital. But the Confederates had still a most
critical time before them, and Lee's daring was never more amply
illustrated than when he made up his mind to fight on the Antietam.
McClellan's great army was streaming through the passes of the South
Mountain. At Rohrersville, six miles east of the Confederate
bivouacs, where he had halted as soon as the cannonade at Harper's
Ferry ceased, Franklin was still posted with 20,000 men. From their
battle-field at Turner's Gap, ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the
70,000 which composed the right and centre; and on the banks of the
Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in position. Jackson had to get
rid of his prisoners, to march seventeen miles, and to ford the
Potomac before he could reach the ground. Walker was twenty miles
distant, beyond the Shenandoah; and McLaws, who would be compelled by
Franklin's presence near Rohrersville to cross at Harper's Ferry
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