oners and public property shall be
disposed of, unless you direct otherwise. The other forces can move
off this evening so soon as they get their rations. To what point
shall they move? I write at this time in order that you may be
apprised of the condition of things. You may expect to hear from me
again to-day, after I get more information respecting the number of
prisoners, etc."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 951. General
Longstreet (From Manassas to Appomattox page 233) suggests that
Jackson, after the capitulation of Harper's Ferry, should have moved
east of South Mountain against McClellan's rear. Jackson, however,
was acquainted neither with McClellan's position nor with Lee's
intentions, and nothing could have justified such a movement except
the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief.)

Lee, with D.H. Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart, was already falling back
from the South Mountain to Sharpsburg, a little village on the right
bank of the Antietam Creek; and late in the afternoon Jackson,
Walker, and McLaws were ordered to rejoin without delay.* (* The
Invasion of Maryland, General Longstreet, Battles and Leaders volume
2 page 666.) September 14 had been an anxious day for the Confederate
Commander-in-Chief. During the morning D.H. Hill, with no more than
5000 men in his command, had seen the greater part of McClellan's
army deploy for action in the wide valley below and to the eastward
of Turner's Gap. Stuart held the woods below Crampton's Gap, six
miles south, with Robertson's brigade, now commanded by the gallant
Munford; and on the heights above McLaws had posted three brigades,
for against this important pass, the shortest route by which the
Federals could interpose between Lee and Jackson, McClellan's left
wing, consisting of 20,000 men under General Franklin, was steadily
advancing.

The positions at both Turner's and Crampton's Gaps were very strong.
The passes, at their highest points, are at least 600 feet above the
valley, and the slopes steep, rugged, and thickly wooded. The enemy's
artillery had little chance. Stone walls, running parallel to the
crest, gave much protection to the Southern infantry, and loose
boulders and rocky scarps increased the difficulties of the ascent.
But the numbers available for defence were very small; and had
McClellan marched during the night he would probably have been master
of the passes before midday. As it was, Crampton's Gap was not
attacked by Franklin until noo