* (* Battles and Leaders volume 2
pages 666, 667.) So spake the voice of prudence. Lee, however, so
soon as he was informed of the fall of Harper's Ferry, had ordered
Jackson to join him, resolving to hold his ground, and to bring
McClellan to a decisive battle on the north bank of the Potomac.

Although 45,000 men--for Lee at most could count on no more than this
number, so great had been the straggling--were about to receive the
attack of over 90,000, Jackson, when he reached Sharpsburg on the
morning of the 16th, heartily approved the Commander-in-Chief's
decision, and it is worth while to consider the reasons which led
them to disagree with Longstreet.

1. Under ordinary conditions, to expect an army of 45,000 to wrest
decisive victory from one of 90,000 well-armed enemies would be to
demand an impossibility. The defence, when two armies are equally
matched, is physically stronger than the attack, although we have
Napoleon's word for it that the defence has the harder task. But that
the inherent strength of the defence is so great as to enable the
smaller force to annihilate its enemy is contrary to all the teaching
of history. By making good use of favourable ground, or by
constructing substantial works, the smaller force may indeed stave
off defeat and gain time. But it can hope for nothing more. The
records of warfare contain no instance, when two armies were of much
the same quality, of the smaller army bringing the campaign to a
decisive issue by defensive tactics. Wellington and Lee both fought
many defensive battles with inferior forces. But neither of them,
under such conditions, ever achieved the destruction of their enemy.
They fought such battles to gain time, and their hopes soared no
higher. At Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onor, where the French were
superior to the allies, Wellington repulsed the attack, but he did
not prevent the defeated armies taking the field again in a few days.
At the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, the North Anna, and Cold Harbour,
the great battles of 1864, Lee maintained his ground, but he did not
prevent Grant moving round his flank in the direction of Richmond. At
the Second Manassas, Jackson stood fast for the greater part of two
days, but he would never have driven Pope across Bull Run without the
aid of Longstreet. Porter at Gaines' Mill held 55,000 men with 35,000
for more than seven hours, but even if he had maintained his
position, the Confederate army would not have become