s of fat oxen, be cut off from the
remainder, but the enemy, using the river as a base, would push his
operations into the very heart of the Confederacy. To regain
possession of the great waterway seemed of more vital importance than
the defence of the Potomac or the secession of Maryland, and now that
Richmond had been relieved, the whole energy of the Government was
expended on the operations in Kentucky and Tennessee. It may well be
questioned whether a vigorous endeavour, supported by all the means
available, and even by troops drawn from the West, to defeat the Army
of the Potomac and to capture Washington, would not have been a more
efficacious means to the same end; but Davis and his Cabinet
consistently preferred dispersion to concentration, and, indeed, the
situation of the South was such as might well have disturbed the
strongest brains. The sea-power of the Union was telling with deadly
effect. Although the most important strategic points on the
Mississippi were still held by Confederate garrisons, nearly every
mile of the great river, from Cairo to New Orleans, was patrolled by
the Federal gunboats; and in deep water, from the ports of the
Atlantic to the roadsteads of the Gulf, the frigates maintained their
vigilant blockade.

Even on the northern border there was hardly a gleam of light across
the sky. The Federal forces were still formidable in numbers, and a
portion of the Army of the Potomac had not been involved in Pope's
defeat. It was possible, therefore, that more skilful generalship
than had yet been displayed by the Northern commanders might deprive
the Confederates of all chance of winning a decisive victory. Yet,
although the opportunity of meeting the enemy with a prospect of
success might never offer, an inroad into Northern territory promised
good results.

1. Maryland, still strong in sympathy with the South, might be
induced by the presence of a Southern army to rise against the Union.

2. The Federal army would be drawn off westward from its present
position; and so long as it was detained on the northern frontier of
Virginia nothing could be attempted against Richmond, while time
would be secured for improving the defences of the Confederate
capital.

3. The Shenandoah Valley would be most effectively protected, and its
produce transported without risk of interruption both to Lee's army
and to Richmond.

To obtain such advantages as these was worth an effort, and Lee,
after carefu