ours, of any
movement we might make. The Federal army, though beaten at the Second
Manassas, was not disorganised, and it would certainly come out to
look for us, and we should guard against being caught in such a
condition. Our army consisted of a superior quality of soldiers, but
it was in no condition to divide in the enemy's country. I urged that
we should keep it in hand, recruit our strength, and get up supplies,
and then we could do anything we pleased. General Lee made no reply
to this, and I supposed the Harper's Ferry scheme was abandoned."* (*
Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 662.)

Jackson, too, would have preferred to fight McClellan first, and
consider the question of communicating afterwards;* (* Dabney volume
2 page 302.) but he accepted with alacrity the duty which his
colleague had declined. His own divisions, reinforced by those of
McLaws, R. H. Anderson,* (* Anderson was placed under McLaws'
command.) and Walker, were detailed for the expedition; Harper's
Ferry was to be invested on three sides, and the march was to begin
at daybreak on September 10. Meanwhile, the remainder of the army was
to move north-west to Hagerstown, five-and-twenty miles from
Frederick, where it would alarm Lincoln for the safety of
Pennsylvania, and be protected from McClellan by the parallel ranges
of the Catoctin and South Mountains.

Undoubtedly, in ordinary circumstances, General Longstreet would have
been fully justified in protesting against the dispersion of the army
in the presence of the enemy. Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry are
five-and-twenty miles apart, and the Potomac was between them.
McClellan's advanced guard, on the other hand, was thirty miles from
Harper's Ferry, and forty-five from Hagerstown. The Federals were
advancing, slowly and cautiously it is true, but still pushing
westward, and it was certainly possible, should they receive early
intelligence of the Confederate movements, that before Harper's Ferry
fell a rapid march might enable them to interpose between Lee and
Jackson. But both Lee and Jackson calculated the chances with a surer
grasp of the several factors. Had the general in command of the
Federal army been bold and enterprising, had the Federal cavalry been
more efficient, or Stuart less skilful, they would certainly have
hesitated before running the risk of defeat in detail. But so long as
McClellan controlled the movements of the enemy, rapid and decisive
action was not to be apprehen