await the
invaders in selected and prepared positions, and if no task more
difficult should devolve upon her troops than shooting down their
foes as they moved across the open to the assault of strong
intrenchments, then the hope might reasonably be entertained that she
might tire out the North. But the campaign, so far as it had
progressed, had shown, if indeed history had not already made it
sufficiently clear, that opportunities for such tactics were not
likely to occur. The Federal generals had consistently refused to run
their heads against earthworks. Their overwhelming numbers would
enable them to turn any position, however formidable; and the only
chance of success lay in keeping these numbers apart and in
preventing them from combining.

It was by strategic and tactical counterstrokes that the recent
victories had been won. Although it had awaited attack within its own
frontier, the Army of Northern Virginia had but small experience of
defensive warfare. With the exception of the actions round Yorktown,
of Cross Keys, and of the Second Manassas, the battles had been
entirely aggressive. The idea that a small army, opposed to one
vastly superior, cannot afford to attack because the attack is
costly, and that it must trust for success to favourable ground, had
been effectually dispelled. Lee and Jackson had taught the
Southerners that the secret of success lies not in strong positions,
but in the concentration, by means of skilful strategy, of superior
numbers on the field of battle. Their tactics had been essentially
offensive, and it is noteworthy that their victories had not been
dearly purchased. If we compare them with those of the British in the
Peninsula, we shall find that with no greater loss than Wellington
incurred in the defensive engagements of three years, 1810, 1811,
1812, the Confederates had attacked and routed armies far larger in
proportion than those which Wellington had merely repulsed.* (*
Wellington's losses in the battles of these three years were 33,000.
The Confederates lost 23,000 in the Valley and the Seven Days and
10,000 in the campaign against Pope. It is not to be understood,
however, that the Duke's strategy was less skilful or less audacious
than Lee's and Jackson's. During these three years his army, largely
composed of Portuguese and Spaniards, was incapable of offensive
tactics against his veteran enemies, and he was biding his time. It
was the inefficiency of his allies an