of the country, superior to the Federal. The whole
population, too, was staunchly Southern. It was always probable,
therefore, that information would be scarce in the Federal camps, and
that if some items did get through the cavalry screen, they would be
so late in reaching Pope's headquarters as to be practically useless.
There can be no question that Lee, in these operations, relied much
on the skill of Stuart. Stuart was given a free hand. Unlike Pope,
Lee issued few orders as to the disposition of his horsemen. He
merely explained the manoeuvres he was about to undertake, pointed
out where he wished the main body of the cavalry should be found, and
left all else to their commander. He had no need to tell Stuart that
he required information of the enemy, or to lay down the method by
which it was to be obtained. That was Stuart's normal duty, and right
well was it performed. How admirably the young cavalry general
co-operated with Jackson has already been described. The latter
suggested, the former executed, and the combination of the three
arms, during the whole of Jackson's operations against Pope, was as
close as when Ashby led his squadrons in the Valley.

Yet it was not on Stuart that fell, next to Lee, the honours of the
campaign. Brilliant as was the handling of the cavalry, impenetrable
the screen it formed, and ample the information it procured, the
breakdown of the Federal horse made the task comparatively simple.
Against adversaries whose chargers were so leg-weary that they could
hardly raise a trot it was easy to be bold. One of Stuart's
brigadiers would have probably done the work as well as Stuart
himself. But the handling of the Valley army, from the time it left
Jefferson on the 25th until Longstreet reached Gainesville on the
29th, demanded higher qualities than vigilance and activity.
Throughout the operations Jackson's endurance was the wonder of his
staff. He hardly slept. He was untiring in reconnaissance, in
examination of the country and in observation of the enemy, and no
detail of the march escaped his personal scrutiny. Fet his muscles
were much less hardly used than his brain. The intellectual problem
was more difficult than the physical. To march his army fifty-six
miles in two days was far simpler than to maintain it on Pope's flank
until Longstreet came into line. The direction of his marches, the
position of his bivouacs, the distribution of his three divisions,
were the outcome of lo