that after Jackson's death Lee never again attempted those
great turning movements which had achieved his most brilliant
victories. Never again did he divide his army to unite it again on
the field of battle. The reason is not far to seek. There was now no
general in the Confederate army to whom he dared confide the charge
of the detached wing, and in possessing one such general he had been
more fortunate than Napoleon.* (* It is noteworthy that Moltke once,
at Koniggratz, carried out the operation referred to; Wellington
twice, at Vittoria and Toulouse; Napoleon, although he several times
attempted it, and, against inferior numbers, never, except at Ulm,
with complete success.)

CHAPTER 2.18. HARPER'S FERRY.

September 1862.

The Confederate operations in Virginia during the spring and summer
of 1862 had been successful beyond expectation and almost beyond
precedent. Within six months two great armies had been defeated;
McClellan had been driven from the Peninsula, and Pope from the
Rappahannock. The villages of Virginia no longer swarmed with foreign
bayonets. The hostile camps had vanished from her inland counties.
Richmond was free from menace; and in the Valley of the Shenandoah
the harvest was gathered in without let or hindrance. Except at
Winchester and Martinsburg, where the garrisons, alarmed by the news
of Pope's defeat, were already preparing to withdraw; in the vicinity
of Norfolk, and at Fortress Monroe, the invaders had no foothold
within the boundaries of the State they had just now overrun; and
their demoralised masses, lying exhausted behind the fortifications
of Washington and Alexandria, were in no condition to resume the
offensive. The North had opened the campaign in the early spring with
the confident hope of capturing the rebel capital; before the summer
was over it was questionable whether it would be able to save its
own. Had the rival armies been equally matched in numbers and
equipment this result would have hardly been remarkable. The Federals
had had great difficulties to contend with--an unknown country, bad
roads, a hostile population, natural obstacles of formidable
character, statesmen ignorant of war, and generals at loggerheads
with the Administration. Yet so superior were their numbers, so ample
their resources, that even these disadvantages might have been
overcome had the strategy of the Southern leaders been less
admirable. Lee, Jackson, and Johnston had played the role of