ng premeditation. On the night of the 25th he
disappeared into the darkness on the road to Salem leaving the
Federals under the conviction that he was making for the Valley. On
the 26th he moved on Bristoe Station, rather than on Manassas
Junction, foreseeing that he might be interrupted from the south-west
in his destruction of the stores. On the 27th he postponed his
departure till night had fallen, moving in three columns, of which
the column marching on Centreville, whither he desired that the enemy
should follow, was the last to move. Concentrating at Sudley Springs
on the 28th, he placed himself in the best position to hold Pope
fast, to combine with Longstreet, or to escape by Aldie Gap; and on
the 29th the ground he had selected for battle enabled him to hold
out against superior numbers.

Neither strategically nor tactically did he make a single mistake.
His attack on King's division at Groveton, on the evening of the
28th, was purely frontal, and his troops lost heavily. But he
believed King to be the flank-guard of a larger force, and under such
circumstances turning movements were over-hazardous. The woods, too,
prevented the deployment of his artillery; and the attack, in its
wider aspect, was eminently successful, for the aim was not to defeat
King, but to bring Pope back to a position where Lee could crush him.
On the 29th his dispositions were admirable. The battle is a fine
example of defensive tactics. The position, to use a familiar
illustration, "fitted the troops like a glove." It was of such
strength that, while the front was adequately manned, ample reserves
remained in rear. The left, the most dangerous flank, was secured by
Bull Run, and massed batteries gave protection to the right. The
distribution of the troops, the orders, and the amount of latitude
accorded to subordinate leaders, followed the best models. The front
was so apportioned that each brigadier on the fighting-line had his
own reserve, and each divisional general half his force in third
line. The orders indicated that counterstrokes were not to be pushed
so far as to involve the troops in an engagement with the enemy's
reserves, and the subordinate generals were encouraged, without
waiting for orders, and thus losing the occasion, to seize all
favourable opportunities for counterstroke. The methods employed by
Jackson were singularly like those of Wellington. A position was
selected which gave cover and concealment to the troops,