and against
which the powerful artillery of a more numerous enemy was practically
useless. These were the characteristics of Vimiera, Busaco, Talavera,
and Waterloo. Nor did Jackson's orders differ from those of the great
Englishman.

The Duke's subordinates, when placed in position, acted on a
well-established rule. Within that position they had unlimited power.
They could defend the first line, or they could meet the enemy with a
counter-attack from a position in rear, and in both cases they could
pursue. But the pursuit was never to be carried beyond certain
defined limits. Moreover, Wellington's views as to the efficacy of
the counterstroke were identical with those of Jackson, and he had
the same predilection for cold steel. "If they attempt this point
again, Hill," were his orders to that general at Busaco, "give them a
volley and charge bayonets; but don't let your people follow them too
far."

But it was neither wise strategy nor sound tactics which was the main
element in Pope's defeat; neither the strong effort of a powerful
brain, nor the judicious devolution of responsibility. A brilliant
military historian, more conversant perhaps with the War of Secession
than the wars of France, concludes his review of this campaign with a
reference to Jackson as "the Ney of the Confederate army."* (*
Swinton. Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.) The allusion is
obvious. So long as the victories of Napoleon are remembered, the
name of his lieutenant will always be a synonym for heroic valour.
But the valour of Ney was of a different type from that of Jackson.
Ney's valour was animal, Jackson's was moral, and between the two
there is a vast distinction. Before the enemy, when his danger was
tangible, Ney had few rivals. But when the enemy was unseen and his
designs were doubtful, his resolution vanished. He was without
confidence in his own resources. He could not act without direct
orders, and he dreaded responsibility. At Bautzen his timidity ruined
Napoleon's combinations; in the campaign of Leipsic he showed himself
incapable of independent command; and he cannot be acquitted of
hesitation at Quatre Bras.

It was in the same circumstances that Ney's courage invariably gave
way that Jackson's courage shone with the brightest lustre. It might
appear that he had little cause for fear in the campaign of the
Second Manassas, that he had only to follow his instructions, and
that if he had failed his failure would hav