him the bad state of the fleet, and the need of a port for the
ships-of-the-line. 'Until we have taken Trincomalee,' he replied, 'the
open roadsteads of the Coromandel coast will answer.'"[188] It was
indeed to this activity on the Coromandel coast that the success at
Trincomalee was due. The weapons with which Suffren fought are
obsolete; but the results wrought by his tenacity and fertility in
resources are among the undying lessons of history.

While the characters of the two chiefs were thus telling upon the
strife in India, other no less lasting lessons were being afforded by
the respective governments at home, who did much to restore the
balance between them. While the English ministry, after the news of
the battle of Porto Praya, fitted out in November, 1781, a large and
compact expedition, convoyed by a powerful squadron of six
ships-of-the-line, under the command of an active officer, to
reinforce Hughes, the French despatched comparatively scanty succors
in small detached bodies, relying apparently upon secrecy rather than
upon force to assure their safety. Thus Suffren, while struggling with
his innumerable embarrassments, had the mortification of learning that
now one and now another of the small detachments sent to his relief
were captured, or driven back to France, before they were clear of
European waters. There was in truth little safety for small divisions
north of the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus the advantages gained by his
activity were in the end sacrificed. Up to the fall of Trincomalee the
French were superior at sea; but in the six months which followed, the
balance turned the other way, by the arrival of the English
reinforcements under Sir Richard Bickerton.

With his usual promptness the French commodore had prepared for
further immediate action as soon as Trincomalee surrendered. The
cannon and men landed from the ships were at once re-embarked, and the
port secured by a garrison strong enough to relieve him of any
anxiety about holding it. This great seaman, who had done as much in
proportion to the means intrusted to him as any known to history, and
had so signally illustrated the sphere and influence of naval power,
had no intention of fettering the movements of his fleet, or risking
his important conquest, by needlessly taking upon the shoulders of the
ships the burden of defending a seaport. When Hughes appeared, it was
past the power of the English fleet by a single battle to reduce the