tness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second
Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text
quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an
exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom,
whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other
languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands
for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and
judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
knowledge, according to human ideas.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]

Whether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual
virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a
gift, speculative and not practical.

Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things
which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation
we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a
mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine
things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to
Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not
practical or active.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom
towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action.
Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher
part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is
the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same
authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and
consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. I, Q. 79,
A. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it
contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so
far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs h