effect of those primal essences. All this, therefore, is of those
essences. The latter are included in the word asat, or unreal, as
distinguished from sat or real of substantial. The soul is sat,
everything else is asat.
1312. In previous Sections it has been explained how when the Chit, which
has pure knowledge for its attribute, becomes invested with Ignorance, it
begins to attract the primal essences towards itself in consequence of
the potencies of past acts and take birth in various shapes. (The idea of
past acts is due to the infinite cycles of creation and destruction, the
very first creation being inconceivable). The causes of creation are,
therefore, the five primal essences, Jiva (or chit), the potencies of
past acts, and Ignorance.
1313. Jnanani is Jnana-karanani, i.e., perceptions for causes of
perception.
1314. The second line of 13 is very condensed. The meaning is this: the
eye is the sense of vision. Vision or sight is its function. The object
it apprehends is form. The eye has light for its cause, and form is an
attribute of light. Hence the eye seizes or apprehends form. By the
inference of reason, there is similitude, in respect of attribute or
property, between the eye, vision, and form. The commentator explains
this clearly Drashtri-darsanadrisya nam trayanamapi gunatamatyam
upapannam. This is indicated with a little variation in the next verse.
K.P. Singha skips over the line. The Burdwan translator gives an
incorrect version.
1315. Manas is mind, Buddhi is Understanding, and Kshetrajna is the Soul.
What, however, is Chitta is difficult to ascertain, unless it means vague
or indefinite perception. In some systems of philosophy the Chitta is
placed above the Understanding.
1316. The Bengal reading yathagantam is preferable to the Bombay reading
yatha mama.
1317. The first line of 27 is grammatically connected with the last line
of 26. The second line of 27 is very abstruse. The grammatical
construction is this: tayorbhavayogamanam (sushuptau) pratyaksham
(drishtam); (tadeva) nityam, ipsitam (cha). What is meant by this is that
in ordinary men, the notions during wakefulness are not the notions they
cherish during dreams: nor are their notions during dreams identifiable
with those they entertain while wakeful. There is similarity but not
identity. In eternal Sushupti, however, which is Emancipation, the
notions of wakefulness pass into those of dream and those of dream pass
into those o
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