his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free
from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the
_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I
have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the
relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.
The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first
problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To
go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_
as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and
in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that
absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which
all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most
distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.
It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing
was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was
accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both
sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a
conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One
requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most
opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from
all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart
from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,
and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In
positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and
disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a
touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar
to some put forward by a long series of English
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