a thousand men who are
remarkable, some for mind, others for penetration, others again for
boldness or strength of will, perhaps not one will combine in himself
all those qualities which are required to raise a man above mediocrity
in the career of a general.
It may sound strange, but for all who know War in this respect it is a
fact beyond doubt, that much more strength of will is required to make
an important decision in Strategy than in tactics. In the latter we are
hurried on with the moment; a Commander feels himself borne along in
a strong current, against which he durst not contend without the most
destructive consequences, he suppresses the rising fears, and boldly
ventures further. In Strategy, where all goes on at a slower rate, there
is more room allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others,
for objections and remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable
regrets; and as we do not see things in Strategy as we do at least
half of them in tactics, with the living eye, but everything must be
conjectured and assumed, the convictions produced are less powerful. The
consequence is that most Generals, when they should act, remain stuck
fast in bewildering doubts.
Now let us cast a glance at history--upon Frederick the Great's campaign
of 1760, celebrated for its fine marches and manoeuvres: a perfect
masterpiece of Strategic skill as critics tell us. Is there really
anything to drive us out of our wits with admiration in the King's first
trying to turn Daun's right flank, then his left, then again his right,
&c.? Are we to see profound wisdom in this? No, that we cannot, if we
are to decide naturally and without affectation. What we rather admire
above all is the sagacity of the King in this respect, that while
pursuing a great object with very limited means, he undertook nothing
beyond his powers, and JUST ENOUGH to gain his object. This sagacity of
the General is visible not only in this campaign, but throughout all the
three Wars of the Great King!
To bring Silesia into the safe harbour of a well-guaranteed peace was
his object.
At the head of a small State, which was like other States in most
things, and only ahead of them in some branches of administration; he
could not be an Alexander, and, as Charles XII, he would only, like him,
have broken his head. We find, therefore, in the whole of his conduct
of War, a controlled power, always well balanced, and never wanting in
energy, which in th
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