and less upon individual talents;
but what is wanting in this respect military virtue should supply. The
natural qualities of a warlike people play just this part: BRAVERY,
APTITUDE, POWERS OF ENDURANCE and ENTHUSIASM.

These properties may therefore supply the place of military virtue, and
vice versa, from which the following may be deduced:

1. Military virtue is a quality of standing Armies only, but they
require it the most. In national risings its place is supplied by
natural qualities, which develop themselves there more rapidly.

2. Standing Armies opposed to standing Armies, can more easily dispense
with it, than a standing Army opposed to a national insurrection, for in
that case, the troops are more scattered, and the divisions left more
to themselves. But where an Army can be kept concentrated, the genius of
the General takes a greater place, and supplies what is wanting in the
spirit of the Army. Therefore generally military virtue becomes more
necessary the more the theatre of operations and other circumstances
make the War complicated, and cause the forces to be scattered.

From these truths the only lesson to be derived is this, that if an Army
is deficient in this quality, every endeavour should be made to simplify
the operations of the War as much as possible, or to introduce double
efficiency in the organisation of the Army in some other respect, and
not to expect from the mere name of a standing Army, that which only the
veritable thing itself can give.

The military virtue of an Army is, therefore, one of the most important
moral powers in War, and where it is wanting, we either see its
place supplied by one of the others, such as the great superiority
of generalship or popular enthusiasm, or we find the results not
commensurate with the exertions made.--How much that is great, this
spirit, this sterling worth of an army, this refining of ore into
the polished metal, has already done, we see in the history of the
Macedonians under Alexander, the Roman legions under Cesar, the Spanish
infantry under Alexander Farnese, the Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus
and Charles XII, the Prussians under Frederick the Great, and the French
under Buonaparte. We must purposely shut our eyes against all historical
proof, if we do not admit, that the astonishing successes of these
Generals and their greatness in situations of extreme difficulty, were
only possible with Armies possessing this virtue.

This spirit ca