whatever advantages the superiority
may give in the first moment, we may have to pay dearly for in the next.
But this danger only endures as long as the disorder, the state of
confusion and weakness lasts, in a word, up to the crisis which every
combat brings with it even for the conqueror. Within the duration of
this relaxed state of exhaustion, the appearance of a proportionate
number of fresh troops is decisive.
But when this disordering effect of victory stops, and therefore only
the moral superiority remains which every victory gives, then it is no
longer possible for fresh troops to restore the combat, they would
only be carried along in the general movement; a beaten Army cannot be
brought back to victory a day after by means of a strong reserve. Here
we find ourselves at the source of a highly material difference between
tactics and strategy.
The tactical results, the results within the four corners of the battle,
and before its close, lie for the most part within the limits of that
period of disorder and weakness. But the strategic result, that is to
say, the result of the total combat, of the victories realised, let them
be small or great, lies completely (beyond) outside of that period.
It is only when the results of partial combats have bound themselves
together into an independent whole, that the strategic result appears,
but then, the state of crisis is over, the forces have resumed their
original form, and are now only weakened to the extent of those actually
destroyed (placed hors de combat).
The consequence of this difference is, that tactics can make a continued
use of forces, Strategy only a simultaneous one.(*)
(*) See chaps. xiii., and xiv., Book III and chap. xxix.
Book V.--TR.
If I cannot, in tactics, decide all by the first success, if I have to
fear the next moment, it follows of itself that I employ only so much of
my force for the success of the first moment as appears sufficient for
that object, and keep the rest beyond the reach of fire or conflict of
any kind, in order to be able to oppose fresh troops to fresh, or with
such to overcome those that are exhausted. But it is not so in Strategy.
Partly, as we have just shown, it has not so much reason to fear a
reaction after a success realised, because with that success the crisis
stops; partly all the forces strategically employed are not necessarily
weakened. Only so much of them as have been tactically in conflict wit
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