the shock of former days.
Thirdly, by lost ground.
All these things serve for the eye of the General as a compass to tell
the course of the battle in which he is embarked. If whole batteries
have been lost and none of the enemy's taken; if battalions have been
overthrown by the enemy's cavalry, whilst those of the enemy everywhere
present impenetrable masses; if the line of fire from his order of
battle wavers involuntarily from one point to another; if fruitless
efforts have been made to gain certain points, and the assaulting
battalions each, time been scattered by well-directed volleys of grape
and case;--if our artillery begins to reply feebly to that of the
enemy--if the battalions under fire diminish unusually, fast, because
with the wounded crowds of unwounded men go to the rear;--if single
Divisions have been cut off and made prisoners through the disruption of
the plan of the battle;--if the line of retreat begins to be endangered:
the Commander may tell very well in which direction he is going with
his battle. The longer this direction continues, the more decided it
becomes, so much the more difficult will be the turning, so much the
nearer the moment when he must give up the battle. We shall now make
some observations on this moment.
We have already said more than once that the final decision is ruled
mostly by the relative number of the fresh reserves remaining at the
last; that Commander who sees his adversary is decidedly superior to him
in this respect makes up his mind to retreat. It is the characteristic
of modern battles that all mischances and losses which take place in
the course of the same can be retrieved by fresh forces, because the
arrangement of the modern order of battle, and the way in which troops
are brought into action, allow of their use almost generally, and in
each position. So long, therefore, as that Commander against whom the
issue seems to declare itself still retains a superiority in reserve
force, he will not give up the day. But from the moment that his
reserves begin to become weaker than his enemy's, the decision may be
regarded as settled, and what he now does depends partly on special
circumstances, partly on the degree of courage and perseverance which he
personally possesses, and which may degenerate into foolish obstinacy.
How a Commander can attain to the power of estimating correctly the
still remaining reserves on both sides is an affair of skilful practical
geniu
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