us losses are sustained, in stragglers,
broken guns, and carriages of all kinds.
The third way is to make a detour, and get round the nearest point of
interception, to march with more ease at a greater distance from the
enemy, and thus to render the haste required less damaging. This
last way is the worst of all, it generally turns out like a new debt
contracted by an insolvent debtor, and leads to greater embarrassment.
There are cases in which this course is advisable; others where there is
nothing else left; also instances in which it has been successful;
but upon the whole it is certainly true that its adoption is usually
influenced less by a clear persuasion of its being the surest way of
attaining the aim than by another inadmissible motive--this motive is
the dread of encountering the enemy. Woe to the Commander who gives in
to this! However much the moral of his Army may have deteriorated, and
however well founded may be his apprehensions of being at a disadvantage
in any conflict with the enemy, the evil will only be made worse by too
anxiously avoiding every possible risk of collision. Buonaparte in 1813
would never have brought over the Rhine with him the 30,000 or 40,000
men who remained after the battle of Hanau,(*) if he had avoided that
battle and tried to pass the Rhine at Mannheim or Coblenz. It is just by
means of small combats carefully prepared and executed, and in which the
defeated army being on the defensive, has always the assistance of the
ground--it is just by these that the moral strength of the Army can
first be resuscitated.
(*) At Hanau (October 30, 1813), the Bavarians some 50,000
strong threw themselves across the line of Napoleon's
retreat from Leipsic. By a masterly use of its artillery the
French tore the Bavarians asunder and marched on over their
bodies.--EDITOR.
The beneficial effect of the smallest successes is incredible; but with
most Generals the adoption of this plan implies great self-command.
The other way, that of evading all encounter, appears at first so much
easier, that there is a natural preference for its adoption. It is
therefore usually just this system of evasion which best, promotes the
view of the pursuer, and often ends with the complete downfall of the
pursued; we must, however, recollect here that we are speaking of a
whole Army, not of a single Division, which, having been cut off,
is seeking to join the main Army by making a de'
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