m, in short, to make the whole
outlay of tactical means which such a course renders necessary. All that
naturally bears with a heavy weight on the pursuing Army, and in War,
where there are so many burdens to be borne, men are always inclined
to strip off those which do not seem absolutely necessary. These
observations are true, whether applied to a whole Army or as in the more
usual case, to a strong advance-guard. For the reasons just mentioned,
this second method of pursuit, this continued pressing of the enemy
pursued is rather a rare occurrence; even Buonaparte in his Russian
campaign, 1812, practised it but little, for the reasons here apparent,
that the difficulties and hardships of this campaign, already threatened
his Army with destruction before it could reach its object; on the other
hand, the French in their other campaigns have distinguished themselves
by their energy in this point also.

Lastly, the third and most effectual form of pursuit is, the parallel
march to the immediate object of the retreat.

Every defeated Army will naturally have behind it, at a greater or less
distance, some point, the attainment of which is the first purpose in
view, whether it be that failing in this its further retreat might be
compromised, as in the case of a defile, or that it is important for
the point itself to reach it before the enemy, as in the case of a great
city, magazines, &c., or, lastly, that the Army at this point will gain
new powers of defence, such as a strong position, or junction with other
corps.

Now if the conqueror directs his march on this point by a lateral road,
it is evident how that may quicken the retreat of the beaten Army in a
destructive manner, convert it into hurry, perhaps into flight.(*) The
conquered has only three ways to counteract this: the first is to throw
himself in front of the enemy, in order by an unexpected attack to gain
that probability of success which is lost to him in general from his
position; this plainly supposes an enterprising bold General, and an
excellent Army, beaten but not utterly defeated; therefore, it can only
be employed by a beaten Army in very few cases.

(*) This point is exceptionally well treated by von
Bernhardi in his "Cavalry in Future Wars." London: Murray,
1906.

The second way is hastening the retreat; but this is just what the
conqueror wants, and it easily leads to immoderate efforts on the part
of the troops, by which enormo